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On the Possibility of a Paratelic Initiation of 
Organizational Wrongdoing 
Abstract 
In terms of reversal theory, both dominant and alternative explanations of the initiation of 
organizational wrongdoing assume that its perpetrators act in a telic state of mind. This leaves 
us with explanations of organizational wrongdoing that are insufficiently appreciative of the 
agent’s experience. The human mind can be creative and imaginative, too, and people can 
fully immerse in their activity. We suggest that the paratelic state of mind is relevant for the 
phenomenological understanding of the initiation of original, creative, daring courses of 
action, and that the paratelic state of mind may originate courses of action that social control 
agents, at a later moment in time, may label as organizational wrongdoing. Our proposal is 
especially relevant when organizational agents are on a course of exploration, facing 
uncertainty, complexity, and unavailability of information.  
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Don’t play the game by the rules. Change it. 
– KPMG advertisement, Copenhagen Airport, November 2015 
 
With his small joke, the stupidest of all ideas became reasonable, even almost sensible, 
maybe even genius. The alternative—sanity—became insane. 
– Jonathan Safran Foer (2016), Here I Am, Hamish Hamilton, p. 387 
 
Introduction 
Organizational wrongdoing is often understood as behavior that is perpetrated by (groups of) 
organizational members who act on behalf of the organization, and that is deviant in the sense 
that it violates criminal, civil, or administrative law, transgresses explicit industry or 
professional codes, or contravenes less codified organizational rules, social norms, and 
ethical principles (Vaughan, 1991; Palmer et al., 2016). The question of how agents [1] 
initiate organizational wrongdoing has been addressed extensively in the behavioral ethics 
literature (Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe, 2008; Greve et al., 2010; Palmer, 2012). The 
question of the initiation of organizational wrongdoing is distinct from questions of its spread 
and perpetuation through processes such as normalization (Ashforth and Anand, 2003), 
gradual escalation (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008), and socialization (MacLean, 2008), 
all of which presume that some wrongdoing has already occurred.  
In naturalistic research settings, the question of the initiation of wrongdoing can only be 
answered post hoc when the researcher has learned about an agent’s course of action. The 
result is an inadequate understanding (Locke and Golden-Biddle, 1997) of the agent’s 
experience in the situation in which s/he finds her/himself (Warren and Smith-Crowe, 2008). 
The agent may have two kinds of experience, both of which have not been taken into account 
in extant explanations of the initiation of organizational wrongdoing. First, the agent may 
experience considerable, if not fundamental, uncertainty and ambiguity around the morality 
of a course of action, or in deciding which course of action would be morally optimal (cf. 
aporia, Derrida, 1992). This implies that even if –or precisely because– s/he has a well 
developed moral awareness and imagination and normal cognitive abilities, s/he may still not 
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be able to derive the morally correct course of action. Second, the agent may experience 
arousal and excitement stemming from being fully immersed in her/his activity, especially 
when s/he is exploring a novel course of action. This experience of arousal may prevent the 
agent from engaging in moral deliberation.  
Palmer’s (2012) classification of explanations of the initiation of organizational wrongdoing 
as “dominant” and “alternative” offers an illustration of our critique. His classification 
critically hinges on the assumed motivation of the agent. Dominant explanations assume that 
organizational wrongdoing is produced by “mindful and rational actors who deliberate in 
social isolation, make discrete decisions, and develop positive inclinations to engage in 
wrongdoing” (Palmer, 2012, p. 3, p. 91). In such explanations, the agent is aware of the 
morality of her/his (intended) course of action and then “mindfully” decides to pursue it. By 
contrast, alternative explanations assume that organizational wrongdoing is produced by 
“mindless […] actors, who formulate their behavior in an immediate social context, in a 
temporally protracted escalating fashion, and who never develop positive inclinations to 
engage in wrongdoing” (Palmer, 2012, p. 3, p. 89). In alternative explanations, the agent 
“mindlessly” conforms her/his behavior to pressures stemming from administrative systems, 
structural power differences or situational social influences, perhaps subordinating her/his 
own moral intuition and judgment to these external forces.  
Either way, there is little place in the explanation for the agent’s experience of doubt, 
ambiguity or uncertainty. The possibilities that wrongdoing originates from accident or from 
social control agents changing the standard by which they judge, do not change our analysis. 
Rather, it is in line with our suggestion that the agent may not know, due to uncertainty or 
ambiguity, if a course of action will be labeled as morally right or wrong at a later point in 
time.  
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Neither does the agent’s experience of arousal, when s/he is fully engaged in activity, play a 
prominent role in dominant and alternative explanations. The mindful agent is predominantly 
seen as calculative, lacking emotion when he decides to do wrong. The mindless agent may 
intuitively understand from experiencing moral emotion “that a potential action is to be 
pursued or avoided” (Moore and Gino, 2015, p. 250). Yet, we argue that arousal can suppress 
moral emotion that otherwise might “point [the agent] in specific behavioral directions and 
amplify the strength of [her/his] moral judgments” (Moore and Gino, 2015, p. 251). 
Although both dominant and alternative explanations of wrongdoing have empirical traction, 
we find their motivational assumptions “inadequate” in the sense of “not sufficiently 
incorporating different perspectives and views of the phenomena under investigation” (Locke 
and Golden-Biddle, 1997, p. 1047). This is notably the case when the agent faces complexity, 
uncertainty, and lack of information related to unbeknownst future events and developments, 
such as in the activity of exploration. Exploration (March, 1991), which is at the core of 
strategic management, new venture creation, and innovation, demands the agent to be 
creative, to think out of the box. This demand makes the activity and its outcomes potentially 
valuable and productive, but also risky, in both material and moral terms. [2] A fuller 
understanding of the agent’s experience helps to understand how exploration results in the 
initiation of novel courses of action; social control agents, once they have learned about them, 
may label some of them as excellent, commendable, and praiseworthy, but others as 
inappropriate, irresponsible, and objectionable – that is, as instances of organizational 
wrongdoing. Thus, our research question is: How may the initiation of organizational 
wrongdoing be understood if we start from the agent’s experience?  
In addressing this question, we draw on the psychological theory of motivation known as 
reversal theory, in particular on its treatment of arousal (Apter, 1989; 1991; 2007). The 
reversal theory treatment of arousal is relevant, because it directly theorizes how people may 
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become engaged and excited in their doings. It explains how people may become creative, 
imaginative, and playful, and how they develop a sense of invulnerability and lose 
attentiveness to future consequences and moral considerations. It is especially relevant when 
people face complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity in their exploration of novel courses of 
action.  
Our overarching contribution is to argue for the relevance of reversal theory to understand the 
initiation of organizational wrongdoing. We propose an account of the initiation of 
organizational wrongdoing that recognizes how exploration inherently involves creativity, 
imagination, and playfulness. This may lure exploration into the realm of make-believe, in 
which its participants lose sight of and sensitivity to the moral dimensions of their proposals 
and decisions. Our argument complements dominant and alternative explanations of the 
initiation of organizational wrongdoing and further speaks to emerging research on ethics and 
creativity (Moran et al., 2014; Muhr, 2010).  
We develop our argument in the following way. First, we modify the consensus approach in 
conceptualizing organizational wrongdoing by highlighting the experience of the agent. 
Second, we shortly introduce reversal theory in order to be able to discuss, subsequently, 
dominant and alternative explanations in light of reversal theory. Next, we propose a stylized 
account of the initiation of organizational wrongdoing that is based on the treatment of 




To define ‘organizational wrongdoing’ is a challenging task, which is perhaps a reason why 
many studies of moral behavior do not offer a definition of wrongdoing (Smith-Crowe and 
Zhang, 2016). Studies that do offer a definition rely on either of two approaches. In one 
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approach, labeled “essentialist” (Warren and Smith-Crowe, 2008; or “exegetical,” Palmer, 
2012), the researcher defines upfront what s/he considers wrong (or right) in some course of 
action. S/he can do so by relying on a criterion or principle that finds its justification in moral 
philosophy, theology or social critique. The essentialist approach can be criticized on the 
ground that there is no general agreement about the question which criterion or principle 
reflects moral truth or has universal validity (cf. Smith, 1993; Palmer, 2012). Absent a moral 
truth, the researcher’s choice remains subjective.  
The researcher may circumvent the uncertain foundation of the essentialist approach by 
focusing on behaviors that many people readily do or likely would agree are wrong, such as 
lying and cheating (Smith-Crowe and Zhang, 2016, p. 20) and various forms of fraud and 
other transgressions of the law. “In this respect, wrongdoing is generally operationalized as 
behaviors that authors assume readers will accept as fitting these broad definitions [i.e., 
violation of ethical principles, social norms, administrative rules, or civil and criminal law] 
and that will be uncontroversial” (Palmer et al., 2016, p. 9). In this move, the essentialist 
approach is turned into a “consensus” (Warren and Smith-Crow, 2008; or “sociological,” 
Palmer, 2012) approach. Although relativist in comparison to the essentialist approach, it 
does have the advantage of obtaining empirical grounding, as it bases itself on how, in a 
social setting, social control agents do judge that some behavior is morally wrong.  
The consensus approach has its limitations, too. Most importantly, social control agents make 
their judgment after the fact, once they have learned of an agent’s course of action. Thus, the 
consensus approach allows the researcher to address the question of how social control agents 
come to label a course of action as wrong (e.g., Graffin et al., 2013), but it turns away from 
the agent in explaining the initiation of wrongdoing. By approaching wrongdoing from the 
perspective of the social control agent, “previous research has overlooked the pervasive 
ambiguity in ethical situations in organizations” (Warren and Smith-Crowe, 2008, p. 81) and 
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therefore “we do not know much about the experience of the transgressors themselves” 
(Warren and Smith-Crowe, 2008, p. 82). Warren and Smith-Crowe (2008) study how well 
meaning employees, who are suddenly confronted with the fact that they have unknowingly 
transgressed in the eyes of others, revise their moral judgment due to the experience of 
embarrassment or (threat of) sanction. This analysis gets Warren and Smith-Crowe closer to 
the agent’s experience, but their analysis is still after the fact.  
From the perspective of the agent, it may not always be clear whether a course of action will 
turn out to be in violation of the criteria, principles, or standards held by a social control 
agent, even if the agent has a well-developed sense of morality or ability in moral reasoning. 
That is, we do not assume that the agent has an under-developed moral imagination 
(Werhane, 1999), that s/he is a priori subject to bounded ethicality (Chugh et al., 2005), or 
that s/he has a deficient mental capacity, low self-control, or an antisocial personality 
disorder (Palmer, 2012, p. 54). Instead, there can be considerable or even fundamentally 
irresolvable uncertainty about the question whether a course of action violates or subverts 
existing rules. In this context, Palmer (2012, p. 8) speaks of the “thin line separating 
wrongdoing from right-doing.” Yet, the metaphor of a thin line may be misleading in 
suggesting that there is a clear distinction between right and wrong, whereas the agent may 
well experience, even in deliberation, that some course of action is associated with an 
unsorted, entangled mesh of both right and wrong. Managerial action, such as in devising 
compensation systems (Larking and Pierce, 2016) or in promoting organizational 
identification (Vadera and Pratt, 2016), can be associated with wrongdoing by some 
employees and with right-doing by other employees, for example. Further, the judgment by 
social control agents is not reflective of a moral truth but socially constructed, for example in 
a macro-level discourse in public media (Graffin et al., 2013; Clemente et al., 2016), adding 
to the uncertainty and ambiguity in the agent’s deliberation. Agents cannot oversee the full 
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material and moral consequences of their courses of action or the social control agents’ future 
judgment of their courses of action.  
This implies that there is no clear, objective distinction between organizational mistake, 
organizational misconduct, and organizational disaster, because they are “socially defined in 
relation to the norms of some particular group,” such that their definition may “vary by level 
of analysis” and that they are defined “only in retrospect when outcomes are known” 
(Vaughan, 1999, p. 283).  
Therefore, for this paper, we rely on the consensus approach to define organizational 
wrongdoing. But we modify it by changing its perspective to the agent’s, which allows us to 
highlight her/his experience. The agent can be supposed to have some understanding of how 
social control agents might, could, would, or perhaps should come to their judgments (given 
their professed standards and assuming that they are not corrupt, Sherman, 1980). Although 
the agent may thus have some orientation to understand whether or why social control agents 
might consider a course of action to be wrong, our approach recognizes the uncertainty and 
ambiguity that the agent may experience regarding the future judgment by social control 
agents. Such uncertainty and ambiguity is even more pronounced when the agent is involved 
in organizational action that implies or demands exploration (March, 1991). From this 
vantage point, we can start to theorize the possibility of an understanding of the initiation of 
organizational wrongdoing that is complementary to dominant and alternative explanations.  
It should be noted that our argument may not be relevant to the entire range of possible types 
of organizational wrongdoing. If corruption is a specific category of wrongdoing at the 
interface with public authorities (Sherman 1980; Torsello and Venard, 2016) and not 
synonymous with organizational wrongdoing (e.g., Ashforth and Anand, 2003; 
Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 2008), then corruption is outside the scope of our argument; Its 
initiation is typically with civil servants in public authorities who rarely if ever engage in the 
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kind of exploration that is central to our theorizing. Neither do we have in mind 
organizational misbehavior when that concept refers to “anything you do at work you are not 
supposed to do,” including “the widest range of behavior—from failure to work very hard or 
conscientiously, through not working at all, deliberate output restriction, practical joking, 
pilferage, sabotage and sexual misconduct” (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999, p. 1-2). Such 
behaviors are interpersonal actions that violate norms of conventional social behavior 
(Lefkowitz, 2006, p. 249), essentially the opposites to organizational citizenship behavior 
(Organ, 1988) and other forms of prosocial organizational behavior (Brief and Motowidlo, 
1986).  
Before we can discuss current explanations of the initiation of wrongdoing in light of reversal 
theory, we first offer a brief introduction to reversal theory. 
 
Reversal Theory 
Reversal theory (Apter, 1989; 1991; 2007) is a psychological theory of motivation that has 
analyzed, among other topics, the various ways in which people experience arousal. This 
strand of reversal theory has been developed as a critique of optimal arousal theories. 
Optimal arousal theories hold that individuals are motivated to reach and perform best at their 
optimal level of arousal. Reversal theory, by contrast, suggests that individuals do not aim for 
one optimal level of arousal, but that depending on their state of mind, they can experience 
both low and high levels of arousal as pleasant. Reversal theory distinguishes two states of 
mind in relation to arousal: telic and paratelic. Both are constantly available, but people can 
only be in one state at a time. Whichever their state of mind, it may reverse to the other for 
various reasons, which we discuss after having defined the telic and paratelic states of mind.  
“The telic state is defined as a state of mind in which one conceives oneself to be pursuing an 
important goal, the behavior being subsidiary and chosen to achieve the goal” (Apter, 1989, 
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p. 22). Apter (1991, p. 16) adds: “In the telic state the end determines the means, the means 
being used simply in the attempt to attain the end. Thus, some need is recognised, or goal 
chosen, and then a suitable activity is selected which is intended to produce satisfaction of 
this need or attainment of the goal.” People in a telic state of mind experience a low level of 
arousal as pleasant and a high level of arousal as unpleasant. Apter uses the nouns 
“relaxation” and “anxiety” as general descriptors of these two situations, respectively, and 
argues that people in a telic state of mind seek relaxation and avoid anxiety. The attainment 
of an important goal requires focus and concentration of effort. Their ability of attaining it is 
enhanced when their effort is undisturbed (relaxation), whereas they become anxious and will 
seek other means to attain their goal when it is disturbed by unexpected events. Apter (1989, 
p.22) uses the example of somebody walking to arrive in time for an important interview, but 
then, when “it begins to appear that one will not achieve this goal, one will choose some 
other means (for example, take a taxi).”  
By contrast, “The paratelic state of mind is one in which the orientation is toward the 
behavior itself, together with its concomitant sensations, in this case any goal being 
conceived as subsidiary and essentially an excuse for the behavior. In other words, there is a 
sense in which […] the ongoing activity is at the focus in the paratelic state” (Apter, 1989, p. 
22). People in the paratelic state of mind act in the moment; they are excited, involved, 
creative, playful (Apter, 1991). In the paratelic state of mind, a high level of arousal is 
experienced as pleasant, whereas a low level of arousal is experienced as unpleasant. Apter 
uses the nouns “excitement” and “boredom” as general descriptors of these two situations, 
respectively. People in the paratelic state of mind seek excitement and avoid boredom. There 
is no goal to be attained, just the activity to be enjoyed. In the example of somebody walking, 
one may walk for the sake of walking and “if in this case it turns out that one's destination is 
beyond one's reach in the time available, one will simply choose another destination, while 
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continuing with one's walk” (Apter, 1989, p. 22). The activity may become a more exiting 
experience if one unexpectedly encounters a friend long not seen, or a rare animal species if 
one is an amateur of nature. In fact, the walker may choose to walk along a path that 
increases the chances of such encounters and thereby the experience of excitement in the 
activity. More generally, people in the paratelic state seek to do activities that offer high 
levels of excitement, which may involve the chance of unexpected encounters, challenges, 
and problems, taking risks, and facing dangers.  
The paratelic state of mind is not just associated with individuals, but can develop among a 
group of people (Apter, 2017). Huizinga’s (1955) discussion of how participants (and 
sometimes their spectators, too) may become fully encapsulated in an intense and 
concentrated game is suggestive of the possibility of a shared paratelic state of mind. 
Winnicott (2005) argues that playfulness is relational and self-reinforcing; in interaction 
playfulness tends to provoke further playfulness, similar to the self-reinforcing increase in 
creativity during a productive brainstorm session.  
The paratelic state of mind is more likely than the telic state of mind to induce the person (or 
group of persons) to explore new possibilities within and for its activity, but also to take its 
consequences less seriously (Apter, 1989, 1991, 2007). In the paratelic state of mind, activity 
becomes a phenomenological experience in which self-consciousness diminishes and 
improvisational potential is enhanced (Feezell, 2013). The paratelic state of mind is 
associated with the experience of flow (Csikszentmihályi, 1990; Wright, 2016), in which a 
sense of the self is lost to the joy of perpetuating the activity at hand (Winnicott, 2005). 
Although this phenomenological experience has been highlighted as a defining characteristic 
of play (e.g. Huizinga, 1955), Apter (1991) insists that the paratelic state of mind is not 
restricted to leisure and play, but instead, that it is regularly experienced in all kinds of human 
activity, including paid work in a job (cf., Feezell, 2013).  
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When people are in the paratelic state of mind, a protective frame builds up that reinforces it 
(Apter, 1991). A protective frame entails the reinforcement of a perspective on risks, dangers, 
challenges, and problems as excitements to be embraced and enjoyed, rather than as anxieties 
to be avoided. Moreover, it creates a feeling of invulnerability. There are three types of 
protective frames: safety-zone, detachment, and confidence (Apter, 2007, pp. 50-51).  
In the safety-zone frame, people are so thoroughly engrossed in their activity that their sense 
of surroundings –including the awareness of risk– fades away. This frame is most closely 
associated with flow (Wright, 2016). In the detachment frame, people perceive themselves as 
outside observers to a situation, detached from it, and unaffected by it. In the confidence 
frame, people’s excitement and positive arousal in facing challenges is enhanced by trust in 
and reliance on their own abilities, equipment, and the people with whom they engage in their 
activity. It helps them to figure out novel ways of dealing with the challenges they encounter 
and gives them a sense of mastery over the situation.  
The three types of protective frames are distinct, but complementary in being able to 
reinforce each other, even if, perhaps, the confidence frame is most relevant to activities 
oriented at exploration, because of its ability to enhance problem solving through devising 
unorthodox, original solutions. They help sustain the paratelic state of mind and thereby 
support people to engage and persist in undertaking daring and risky activities.  
Although the buildup of a protective frame reinforces the paratelic state of mind and 
increases its longevity, it can be broken. Apter (2007) discusses frustration, satiation, and 
contingency as reasons why a protective frame may break, and why consequentially the 
person reverses from a paratelic to a telic state of mind. Frustration refers to the repeated 
experience of failure to master a challenge, satiation to the passing of time, as there is a limit 
to how long one is able to enjoy any activity, and contingency to the unexpected disturbance 
by some event that is external to the activity in which the person is immersed. The break of a 
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protective frame can be temporary and the paratelic state of mind may immediately return 
when a person takes up again the interrupted activity.  
With high positive arousal and a protective frame in place, the paratelic state of mind results 
in a shared sense of enjoyment and allows for more creative and unorthodox deployments of 
available skills to meet the challenge at hand. This enables participants to think of and 
explore propositions that would not always make sense or be readily accessible for people in 
the telic state of mind. The paratelic constitutes a break away from telic constraints: the 
analytical means-ends analysis and care about the wider consequences of action.  
 
Explanations of the Initiation of Organizational Wrongdoing in Light of Reversal 
Theory 
Based on this brief sketch of reversal theory we can now appraise the extant literature that 
seeks to explain the initiation of organizational wrongdoing in light of reversal theory. We 
rely on Palmer’s (2012) distinction between dominant and alternative explanations. [3] 
Dominant explanations of the initiation of wrongdoing include rational choice and strain 
theories. Rational choice explanations maintain that agents are opportunistic, for example in 
exploiting information asymmetries. Strain theories predict that people will seek illegitimate 
means of achieving their aspirations when legitimate means are blocked and when the (short-
term) benefits outweigh (long-term) costs and risks. Such explanations critically assume that 
the agents are rational beings: mindful and deliberate, the knowing and willing trespassers of 
laws, codes, rules, and norms under conditions of opportunity or strain (Maclean, 2008; 
Palmer, 2012).  
Although often used, dominant explanations of organizational wrongdoing remain limited 
(Palmer, 2012). First, they insufficiently acknowledge that people are rationally and ethically 
bounded (Chugh et al., 2005) and subject to non-cognitive influences such as intuitions, 
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feelings and emotions. Second, they can be mistaken in viewing ethical decision making as 
an isolated one-off event, instead of viewing it as embedded in and entangled with other 
decision making processes and social situations.  
A series of alternative explanations address some of these concerns by proposing how 
organizational members, while focusing on task accomplishment, may unwillingly become 
wrongdoers. For example, they may make a mistake, an accident may happen, or a social 
control agent may change its standard of judgment. They may also become implicated in 
wrongdoing when they –mindlessly but obeying– conform to pressures stemming from 
administrative systems, structural power differences, or situational social influences (Palmer, 
2012). Their wrongdoing is unintended; they have no control over the circumstances and 
conditions of their work. 
In terms of reversal theory, both dominant and alternative explanations assume that agents act 
in a telic state of mind. When decision-making is done in a telic state of mind, decision 
makers are future-oriented, purposeful, anxiety avoiding, detached, and professional. The 
agents that figurate in dominant and alternative explanations both pursue important goals. 
The protagonists in dominant explanations operate in a rational, deliberative, and calculative 
manner. They are mindful in knowingly and willingly employing means that are illegitimate, 
deceitful, and potentially harmful to others. Their action is self-serving, or “self-serving by 
proxy” when it “serves the policies, directives and/or aims of the organization, not one's own 
personal interests” (Lefkowitz, 2006, p. 247). The protagonists in alternative explanations are 
equally telic, but their important goal is to accomplish the tasks given them. They are 
mindless in conforming to their situation.  
Although both sets of explanations do have empirical validity, they attribute too much 
mindfulness to a few abnormal people and too little mindfulness to all the normal others. In 
addition to the telic mindfulness of willful perpetrators and their self-serving calculus of 
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instrumental rationality (as per dominant explanations) and the telic mindlessness of 
submissive organizational members that conform to their immediate local context (as per 
alternative explanations), there is also the possibility of paratelic creativity and imagination, 
especially when people get fully immersed in their activities.  
We suggest that the paratelic state of mind is relevant for understanding the initiation of 
courses of action associated with exploration (March, 1991), which are at risk, at a later 
moment in time, of being labeled by social control agents as instances of organizational 
wrongdoing. In the next section, we elaborate our proposal.  
 
Exploration and the Paratelic State of Mind 
“Exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, risk taking, 
experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation” (March, 1991, p. 71). More 
generally, it “involves searching for and trying new ways of doing things” (Miller and 
Ireland, 2005, p. 22). Exploration “engages individuals and organizations in search, 
experimentation, and variation” (Lavie et al., 2010, p. 110). There is widespread belief that 
exploration is crucial to organizational success and longevity, and therefore central to 
strategic management, innovation, and the creation of new business ventures (Lavie et al., 
2010). Exploration helps organizations to overcome challenges, venture novel grounds, and 
do things radically different (Hamel, 1996; Ramírez and Mannervik, 2016), as it takes 
organizations beyond “their current knowledge base and skills” (Lavie et al., 2010, p. 114).  
Although March (1991) –and many scholars after him– argues for a balance between 
exploration and exploitation, he is critical of exploitation. March argues, on the one hand, that 
many organizations tend to prefer exploitation over exploration (because exploitation has 
more predictable outcomes) and, on the other hand, that exploitation “degrades organizational 
learning in a mutual learning situation [which in turn] leads to convergence between 
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organizational and individual beliefs” (March, 1991, p. 85). Exploration is therefore to be 
promoted, but at the same time, it is –almost by definition– a form of deviant behavior, as it 
seeks to disrupt the status quo and its outcomes are uncertain.  
The pursuit of novelty has a complex relationship with ethics (Moran, 2014). There is a dark 
side to exploration as it may turn into “foolishness”, which is to be “inhibited by reason” 
(March, 1991, p. 73). March arguably refers to foolishness in economic terms, but he might 
also have referred to it in moral terms. Yet, instead of a priori considering novelty and 
creativity in exploration as inherently immoral, we delve into the agent’s experience of the 
practice of exploration, in order to show how exploration has qualities and affordances that 
may work to decenter moral considerations.  
Exploration Entails a Paratelic State of Mind  
Exploration is not just associated with a paratelic state of mind, it invokes and relies on it. 
This is due to its dealing with epistemic uncertainty, to its tools and technologies, and to it 
being an activity that is separated in space and time from exploitation.  
Epistemic uncertainty. Exploration seeks to condition future organizational successes. As a 
kind of prognostic activity, exploration is confronted with an epistemic uncertainty: it seeks 
to know what it cannot know. As the future state of affairs has not yet happened, there is the 
insurmountable problem of the combination of uncertainty, complexity, and unavailability of 
information, and all the more so when the future is more distant and in an environment that is 
more uncertain, complex, and variable. Exploration cannot rely on extrapolation from the 
present. The future is, at best, in a stage of becoming (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002) and what 
exploration can deliver is therefore but a phenomenological anticipation of what might be 
(Vesa and Franck, 2013). Epistemic uncertainty in exploration offers space for intuition as a 
“holistic hunch” (Miller and Ireland, 2005). In bridging the present and the future, 
exploration requires imagination and creativity (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985; Mintzberg, 
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1994). Imagination helps one to deal with the epistemic uncertainty, because “imagination 
represents things that are absent [i.e. the future and knowledge thereof]; imagination unifies 
the empirical and the ideal [i.e. strategy goals, business plans, ambitions]; and imagination 
fills out and extends incomplete experience [i.e. the future as not yet experienced]” (Weick, 
2005, p. 427).  
Therefore, exploration works with knowledge that is conjecture, speculative supposition. It 
may have started as the telic pursuit of an important goal, but the lack of epistemic certainty 
makes it likely that the organizational members engaged in exploration reverse to the 
paratelic state of mind. Vice versa, their paratelic state of mind facilitates the workings of 
intuition, creativity, and imagination. Therefore, exploration entails a paratelic state of mind.  
Dedicated tools and techniques. Whilst the future cannot be known, it can be anticipated, 
enacted, or played out through the use of dedicated tools and techniques to help bridging the 
present and the future. Among them are strategic scenario planning, simulations, visions, road 
maps, and strategic back-casting. They are designed to facilitate and stimulate imagination to 
make sense of an unknown future.  
Occasionally, organizations seek to stimulate the creativity and imagination of employees 
engaged in exploration. For example, the chairperson of strategy workshops –the CEO, a top 
manager, a facilitator from a prestigious consultancy firm– makes use of techniques and 
interventions developed in small-group psychology to stimulate a paratelic state of mind 
among the participants, for example in brainstorming. This further encourages the 
practitioners of exploration, implicitly or explicitly, to reach out for grander, more grandiose 
(Alvesson and Gabriel, 2016) future worlds that might be. 
These tools and techniques are squarely in the domain of the paratelic state of mind, as the 
very reason why they can be effective –stimulus of imagination– makes no sense and cannot 
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be made productive in a telic state of mind. In fact, they have a recursive relationship with the 
paratelic state of mind: they stimulate it and they rely on it.  
Organizational and temporal separation. Exploration is separated, organizationally and 
temporally, from the ordinary, day-to-day organizational practices that exploit competences, 
competitive positions, and economies of scale and scope (Hodkingson et al., 2006; 
Jarzabkowski and Seidl, 2008; Lavie et al., 2010). In many organizations, exploration has 
become the turf and responsibility of professionals with special competencies and status 
(March, 2006). Such exploration professionals are often employed in dedicated 
organizational units. Exploration can also done during dedicated events, such as strategy 
workshops and away-days. Participation in them is embellished with substantial prestige, due 
to being located off the organization’s premises and to having restricted participation. In new 
business ventures, exploration is largely prior to the as-yet unrealized, inexistent operational 
stage of the venture. Also in established organizations, exploration is prior to exploitation 
even if occasionally unexpected disruptions of exploitation may precipitate explorative 
activities.  
Meetings and workshops for exploration are rituals in and out of themselves (Johnson et al., 
2010); their participants are often excited, being out of their daily routines, feeling important 
as partakers in creating vistas for future success. As pointed out by theorists of play 
(Huizinga, 1955), this separation from the mundane is a core aspect of rendering an activity 
playful. In and out of itself, it stimulates a paratelic state of mind.  
These three characteristics of exploration –epistemic uncertainty, dedicated tools and 
techniques, and organizational and temporal separation– are consequential for the experience 
of its practice. They work to render exploration an activity done for its own sake, because it 
has little if any empirical grounding but instead needs to rely on imagination in its 
articulation of aspiration. Further, the use of dedicated tools and techniques gives exploration 
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a structure that orients the imagination fully to the articulation of aspiration and associated 
courses of action. When skillfully used, they help to produce a rounded off, seamless 
construction of aspiration, but also to build up a protective frame of confidence because they 
deliver. Simultaneously, the organizational and temporal separation of exploration stimulates 
the buildup of a protective frame of detachment.  
Creation and Retention of Daring Proposals for Courses of Action  
Being paratelic allows exploration to create a world that might be, through which the 
formulation of radically new courses of action, scenarios of new futures, and speculative 
ideas becomes possible. There is a focus on aspects of future organizational activity that are 
hitherto unaccomplished. Therefore, exploration produces proposals for daring courses of 
action (Miller and Ireland, 2005). But their appraisal, when done in a paratelic state of mind, 
is different from when it would be done in a telic state of mind. Two qualities of the paratelic 
state of mind –the selective appreciation of risk and a shortened temporal horizon– may result 
in retaining proposals for courses of action that in a telic state of mind might be rejected. 
Exploration not only triggers paratelic playfulness, it also sets the scene for a weakening of 
telic rationality; objections and reservations that could have been made in a telic state of mind 
are sidelined or derided as spoilers of developing the big picture.  
Selective appreciation of risk. In the paratelic state of mind, the agents’ focus in the activity is 
directed towards the pleasant sense of thrill that arises from their perception of mastering the 
future. Agents derive their satisfaction from their –potentially false– feeling of controlling 
risk. It is important to note that in the paratelic state of mind the seeking after danger or risk-
based excitement is done for its own sake; it is not based on a rational, telic analysis of the 
feasibility of accomplishing what has been set out.  
The other side of the coin is that this limits the number of risks that are considered in the first 
place. If some proposed courses of action are risky, in material or moral terms, participants in 
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the paratelic state are unlikely to notice them, or if they do, to focus their attention on those 
risks that they believe they can master and to underestimate the importance of other risks. 
The selective appreciation of risk is already implied in March’s (1991) discussion of 
exploration. He notes that the returns of exploration are “systematically less certain, more 
remote in time, and organizationally more distant from the locus of action and adaption 
[exploitation]” (March, 1991, p. 73), they are “uncertain, distant, and often negative” (March, 
1991, p. 85). However, people tend to underestimate and undervalue risks that are at a longer 
time distance. Importantly, temporal distance has been argued to increase moral distance, too 
(Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011, pp. 56-60).  
Shortened temporal horizon. Another consequence of paratelic exploration is paradoxical. 
Whereas exploration attempts to envision unanticipated futures, it actually results in a 
shortened mental temporal horizon. This is because the paratelic condition is strongly 
inductive of flow (Csikszentmihályi, 1990), in which the focus of practitioners is on the here-
and-now of their activity. Therefore, whereas the paratelic state of mind is powerful when it 
comes to being creative, it is not particularly robust when it comes to evaluating the long-
term consequences or path dependencies of proposed courses of action. This is amplified by 
its tendency to eschew trend-based analyses. In a way, this is understandable because 
exploration results in the creation of a wider range of choice alternatives. This complicates 
their telic appraisal and limits the depth of understanding of particular choice alternatives.  
Rendering Daring Proposals Exploitable 
Whereas the previous pointed out how exploration plants the seeds for courses of action that 
at a later point in time social control agents may label as organizational wrongdoing, it does 
not explain how they find grounding in organizational practice. The outcomes of exploration 
are narratives, captured in statements and sketches from the drawing board. Yet, these 
deliverables cannot be implemented as such. As observed by Barry and Elmes (1997), the 
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development of strategies as narrative statements is constrained by the dual requirement of 
being novel and credible. The grand vision needs to be rendered telic, to be objectified and 
captured in quantifiable constructs for them to enter the exploitative practices of the everyday 
life of organizations.  
For example, in strategic management, the paratelic exploration of possible futures is 
followed, ideally, by telic analysis aimed at understanding their exploitability and assessing 
their propositional quality (Ramírez and Mannervik, 2016). But occasionally the outcomes of 
paratelic exploration become reified without being exposed to telic analysis. Likewise, in 
creating a new venture, the entrepreneur has –is expected to have– a business idea that 
sweeps the market. S/he needs to amass support and resources, for example from friends, 
potential business partners and venture capitalists. The proverbial elevator pitch is essentially 
aimed at overcoming telic skepticism and stimulating paratelic arousal and enthusiasm on the 
part of potential supporters. The business plan, in this respect, is a device that shrouds novelty 
in a telic cloak. This occurs through a process that we call telic reprocessing. Telic 
reprocessing has cognitive and relational aspects and acts as a substitute process for telic 
analysis.  
Cognitive telic reprocessing. The elaboration of the outcomes of exploration makes use of 
“technologies of rationality” (March, 2006; cf. Cabantous and Gond, 2011). Through 
organizational routines such as budgeting, planning, economizing, operations analysis, 
strategic analysis, and business plans, daring proposals are quantified as indicators and 
targets, and thus made operational. When they get converted into numbers and operational 
processes, they assume a guise of rationality (Porter, 1995). The use of technologies of 
rationality is legitimized by their reliance on three components: abstractions, data, and 
decision rules (March, 2006, p. 203). Yet, their validity is often limited by lack of, or 
uncertainty about, correspondence with empirical reality. Notably, there may be uncertainty 
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about the relevance of critical variables and presumed causalities in the model, reliable data 
may be unavailable or non-existent, and the expectation of consequences may be close to a 
wild guess. Therefore, instead of being elaborated through validation, the outcomes of 
exploration are processed to manufacture rationality (Cabantous and Gond, 2011).  
Relational telic reprocessing. Cognitive telic reprocessing is reinforced by relational telic 
reprocessing when the outcomes of exploration are handed down within the organization for 
further elaboration. Their context of production, if not plain managerial instruction, gives 
them authority within the organization (cf. Jackall, 1988). This results in a loss of memory 
regarding the event and context in which they were originally developed, and all the more so 
if those assigned to elaborate them have a lower hierarchical status in the organization, and 
when their elaboration enters more advanced stages in the organization’s planning routines.  
Thus, an important sleigh-of-hand takes place as the paratelic sources of daring courses of 
action get effectively hidden from sight through telic reprocessing, such that what was once 
imaginative, creative, and playful obtains status in the organization as something profoundly 
telic and rational. In this way, the ideas and visions developed in a paratelic state of mind are 
rationalized and made operational into the telic everyday life of the organization, to become 
the source of courses of action that –consistent with the consensus approach– may be labeled 
as instances of wrongdoing by social control agents at a later moment in time. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
It is all but easy to understand why occasionally some organizations end up perpetrating 
wrongdoing. For one, we only learn of wrongdoing after the fact, once discovered and 
flagged for attention. This implies that attempts at explaining the initiation of actual instances 
of organizational wrongdoing are necessarily post hoc, assuming, in the case of rational 
choice and strain theories, for example, that agents faced concrete decision options, foresaw 
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material and moral consequences, and knowingly and willingly made the deliberate choice to 
pursue a particular course of action. But in real-life situations, the agent’s experience may be 
different from these assumptions: decision alternatives may not be clear at all, and even if 
they are, their moral or material consequences may be ambiguous, equivocal, or irresolvable 
(Derrida, 1992). Further, the agent may experience a high level of positive arousal, stemming 
engagement with and immersion in her/his activity, especially when this is about exploration, 
which demands imagination and creativity. The outcomes of exploration may turn out to be 
instances or wrongdoing, but to explain them as accidents –as per one of the alternative 
explanations– ignores the context of their initiation.  
In our argument, we therefore offer a novel proposal, based on the treatment of arousal in 
reversal theory, to understand the initiation of organizational wrongdoing. It takes up Warren 
and Smith-Crowe’s (2008) claim that the agent’s experience is insufficiently acknowledged.  
Our proposal builds on the argument that exploration entails a paratelic state of mind. In 
dealing with epistemic uncertainty, those involved in exploration act in a paratelic state of 
mind, in which creativity and flow prosper and a protective frame of confidence builds up 
and persists. Aided by the tools and techniques of exploration, and the organizational and 
temporal separation of exploration from exploitation, the paratelic state of mind entices its 
participants to be imaginative and creative in dealing with epistemic uncertainty, and thereby 
helps them to conceive of daring courses of action. These courses of action have an increased 
chance of being retained, as the paratelic state of mind leads to a selective appreciation of the 
material and moral risks associated with them and to a shorted temporal horizon. Subsequent 
telic reprocessing lends them credibility and obscures their paratelic roots, such that they may 
become part of the day-to-day dealings of the organization. A paratelic state of mind is 
required for exploration to be productive; it may result in organizational excellence but it can 
also be a source of future wrongdoing.  
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Reversal theory has its own assumptions. Empirical evidence supports the plausibility of the 
basic tenets of reversal theory; we refer the interested reader to Apter (2007). We believe that 
the theory offers a useful vantage point to expand the body of literature that seeks to 
understand the initiation of organizational wrongdoing.  
Accordingly, our paper makes one overarching contribution in arguing for the relevance of 
reversal theory for understanding the initiation of organizational wrongdoing. It elaborates 
the under-acknowledged experience of agents in exploration and proposes how the initiation 
of organizational wrongdoing may be located in the very nature of the activity and practice of 
exploration. This speaks to various strands of ethical decision-making theory.  
Implications for Theory 
First, our proposal is complementary to extant dominant and alternative explanations. It does 
not contradict their empirical relevance: occasionally, agents do plan to do wrong, and 
sometimes wrongdoing is accidental. However, it does expose and challenge some of the 
assumptions underlying these explanations and explores the space outside the domain 
covered by them (cf. Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011). Our proposal begins to explore a 
phenomenological understanding of the agent’s experience of the situation in which s/he 
finds her/himself. Table 1 positions our proposal in relation to dominant and alternative 
explanations.  
=== Insert Table 1 about here === 
As in alternative explanations, our proposal implies that organizational wrongdoing is a 
normal phenomenon; In contra-distinction to dominant explanations, it does not assume 
particular personality traits among organizational participants. However, it suggests that 
people, when engaged in work, alternate –reverse– between telic and paratelic states of mind. 
Especially those situations, tasks, or practices that call for imagination and creativity, such as 
when people explore new possibilities in the face of complexity, uncertainty, and 
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unavailability of information, invoke the paratelic state of mind. Further, our proposal does 
not impose constraints on agency, as alternative explanations do, but allows for imagination, 
creativity and playfulness as sources for agency. This also in contrast to dominant 
explanations, which assume that behavior follows a positive inclination to wrongdoing that is 
developed after rational deliberation and calculus. Yet, the paratelic path to wrongdoing is 
not intentional in the sense that agents knowingly and willingly engage in illegitimate action; 
neither is organizational wrongdoing the consequence of mindless behavior in social 
situations over which agents have no control. It is unintentional in the sense that agents may 
become overly confident and reckless, when a protective frame of confidence and a sense of 
mastery prevents them from fully acknowledging the risks and dangers of their daring 
proposals.  
Deliberate organizational wrongdoing may demand a considerable amount of creativity and 
ingenuity. An account thereof is missing in dominant explanations. Rational choice and strain 
theories do not problematize why and how people devise their wrongdoings. There is little 
place for creativity other than as an unproblematic step after the agent has made the 
conscious decision to engage in wrongdoing. Our proposal suggests that creativity –
stimulated in and through the paratelic state of mind– may be a first step on the route towards 
both wrongdoing and excellence. This step is risky, because uncertainty and ambiguity about 
material and moral consequences put limits to the efficacy and validity of a process of telic 
scrutiny, on the one hand, and because a protective frame may build up that sustains the 
paratelic state of mind, on the other hand.  
In relation to the various alternative explanations that Palmer (2012) discusses, our proposal 
is related to groupthink (Janis, 1989), one of the “situational social influence” explanations. 
Groupthink is the phenomenon that members of a group develop a strong sense of loyalty and 
conformity to their group, to the consequences that they lose the ability of “independent 
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critical thinking” (Janis, 1989, p. 424). Our account of reversal theory suggests that that the 
paratelic state of mind and the associated buildup of a protective frame can be an antecedent 
of groupthink. It suggests that a group’s activity –exploration– and its artefacts –tools and 
techniques– may have affordances that stimulate groupthink. It also suggests that group 
homogeneity –in terms of their members’ demographics and experience– and stress are 
moderators but not antecedents of the likelihood that groupthink establishes. Further, it 
addresses the problem that groupthink theory has in explaining how proposals for the 
adoption of “inhumane,” “irrational,” or “immoral” decisions or courses of action –a possible 
consequence of groupthink, Janis (1989)– can be brought to the table in the first place.  
Second, our proposal speaks to the distinction between essentialist and consensus approaches 
to define organizational wrongdoing. In both approaches the account of ethics is restrictive 
(Kjonstad and Willmott, 1995): they put boundaries, by prior definition or by post hoc 
judgment, to courses of action and thereby favor the status quo rather than engaging with the 
possibility of novelty. These approaches to business ethics have difficulty in dealing with 
innovation, novelty, and creativity as they see them as inherently disruptive of the status quo 
(cf. Moran, 2014).  
Our modification of the consensus approach, from the perspective of the social control agent 
to that of the agent –highlighting uncertainty and paratelic immersion in the activity– can be 
interpreted as leading to a plea to reinforce the conservatism of restrictive ethics. After all, if 
exploration can result in courses of action that are instances of organizational wrongdoing, 
then one could reasonably argue that exploration should be tightly controlled. However, in 
this interpretation, there is the risk of throwing out the baby with the bathwater, to use the 
colloquial expression. Exploration has brought much that is commendable and much that is 
regrettable. Even if there often is ground for a prudent attitude toward the novel, our modified 
consensus approach should not be interpreted as a plea for conservatism and a restrictive 
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ethics. Precisely because of the condition of uncertainty, a Levinasian stance to ethics as 
leaving one’s comfort zone to explore the encounter with the unknown may lead one to find 
not only “ethics in creativity” but also ”creativity in ethics” (Muhr, 2010; Moran, 2014).  
Further, our proposal points out limitations in rational models of ethical decision-making, 
such as those developed by Rest (1986) and Jones (1991). Such models “have [traditionally] 
posited that the process of ethical decision making is cognitive, deliberate, and governed by 
reason” (Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe, 2008, p. 571). This assumption also appears regularly 
in the popular press and is fundamental to the presentation of evidence by prosecutors in 
court trials against suspects of wrongdoing. Moral deliberation in these rational models starts 
from choice options and dilemmas as givens, ready at hand, rather than with their production. 
The point of exploration is precisely to generate novel choice options. Further, and given the 
options at hand, there is the assumption that it is possible to make an informed choice for the 
morally correct option; There is little attention to how uncertainty, ambiguity, and lack of 
information complicate the choice. The farther away in the future and the more abstract the 
choice options, the less possible it becomes to develop a full understanding of their material 
and moral consequences.  
Finally, our proposal also speaks to discussions about the role of emotions in moral judgment 
(Moore and Gino, 2015). Emotions are typically seen in a positive light. “Emotions provide 
an efficient and effective signal, without having to engage in cognitive effort, that a potential 
action is to be pursued or avoided” (Moore and Gino, 2015, p. 250). “The key here is that 
emotions point us in specific behavioral directions and amplify the strength of our moral 
judgments” (Moore and Gino, 2015, p. 251). Conversely, rational choice and strain 
explanations associate the perpetrators of wrongdoing with an absence of emotional feelings. 
In this light it is troublesome that "many jobs and professions are designed to intentionally 
mute emotional responses" (Moore and Gino, 2015, p. 251). Emotional muting is the “limited 
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personal response to distress cues as well as their compromised ability to make appropriate 
attributions about others’ moral emotions" (Moore and Gino, 2015, p. 251).  
This overview suggests that the presence of emotions acts as a positive force to enhance 
ethical decision making, whereas its absence or muting takes away constraints to 
wrongdoing. Our proposal suggests that emotions may also play another role. High positive 
arousal in the paratelic state of mind may prevent the sending of “an efficient and effective 
signal” and reduce the strength of moral judgment. Consequently, the role of emotions in 
understanding both organizational right-doing and wrongdoing may be more complicated 
than it appears in the literature. 
Implications for Research 
Our argument is a conceptual proposal to understand better how exploration, the activity of 
developing novel ideas, ultimately may result in organizational wrongdoing, as well as in 
organizational excellence, without recurring to an explanation that assumes culpability in 
terms of knowingly and willingly seeking to do wrong, nor to one that renders organizational 
participants mindless. Whether this plays out as we propose and what is its prevalence are 
questions for empirical inquiry. Depending on the specific research interest, we see at least 
three ways in which such research can be conducted. They build on and extend a research 
approach that studies business ethics as practice (Clegg et al., 2007; Painter-Morland, 2011). 
Firstly, ours is an argument about the possible paratelic initiation of organizational 
wrongdoing. What is therefore at stake is capturing the moment of its inception. This calls for 
fine-grained ethnographic (Rosen, 1991; Yanow, 2012; Vesa and Vaara, 2014), or even 
insider research (Alvesson, 2003; Brannick & Coghlan, 2007), methods to document in great 
detail the early stages of exploration in activities such as strategic planning, innovation, and 
new venture creation. Such fieldwork needs to be unobtrusive. Obtrusive observation, such as 
in participation and other intervention-focused methods reduce the likelihood that those 
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engaged in exploration enter or remain in a paratelic state of mind, because the very presence 
of the researcher-as-a-researcher can exert social control agency. Furthermore, retaining a 
distinct sense of distance is also important from a research ethics point of view in such 
research, as the ethnographer should not be held accountable for how the exploration 
initiative unfolds. Yet, and somewhat paradoxically, because organizational wrongdoing is 
flagged ex-post, there can occur circumstances in which the researcher has been accidentally 
present in events later flagged as wrongdoing. Such an event, though likely uncomfortable, 
can also be serendipitous because it allows the researcher to mobilize a potentially fascinating 
insider perspective on the initiation of organizational wrongdoing. 
This being said, it will not be easy to conduct this kind of research as the likelihood of 
encountering a situation of incepting exploration initiatives that end up being labeled as 
misconduct cannot be determined a priori. Therefore, what might work best is simply to 
document the early stages of exploration processes in high detail, observing the participants’ 
states of mind and registering whether, how, and why any ideas put forward are rejected or 
retained. Doing so might reveal important insights regarding how the selective appreciation 
of risk and shortened temporal horizons come to be during the early stages of exploration. 
Secondly, moving beyond the initial inception of paratelic daring ideas, research may focus 
on the processes through which such ideas are retained in subsequent organizational decision-
making. This would call for longitudinal, potentially comparative, case study research (e.g., 
Pettigrew, 1990) to examine the telic reprocessing of these ideas. Questions to be studied 
include: How exactly are ideas transferred from idea generation to operational processes? 
How are daring ideas transformed to enter organizational routines such as budgeting, 
planning, economizing, operations analysis, strategic analysis, and business plans? How are 
daring ideas that typically exist as narratives (Barry and Elmes, 1997) quantified to become 
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indicators and targets, and thus made operational? How is the meaning and interpretation of 
explorative initiatives changed when they are handed down within the organization? 
Finally, abduction with the aid of historical research methods (Vaara and Lamberg, 2016) 
offers the possibility to re-examine interpretations of organizational wrongdoing. There is a 
tendency among researchers and social control agents, such as the judiciary and the mass 
media, to give highly telic interpretations to explain organizational wrongdoing. But, it is also 
possible that such interpretations overplay their hand simply because it is expedient for 
pursuing the case successfully in legal and administrative processes. Thus, the interpreting by 
researchers and social control agents may itself be a form of telic reprocessing. Careful 
examination of historical cases of organizational misconduct may open up possibilities for 
examining in detail how the establishing of wrongdoing occurred in relation to what actually 
took place. Whilst not seeking to sidestep questions of accountability, such studies might 
reveal exactly how the epistemic uncertainty can influence exploration initiatives and how 
organizations defend themselves against accusations of intent.  
Practical Implications  
If our proposal finds empirical support, then the paratelic state of mind should be frequently 
observed and proven relevant in situations that call for creativity and playfulness, such as 
exploration in strategic planning, innovation, and new venture creation. It should be clear that 
neither the telic nor the paratelic state of mind is good or bad in and out of itself. Yet, if 
exploration is done in an unmoderated paratelic state of mind, the likelihood increases that 
exploration produces courses of action that social control label as wrongdoing at a later stage. 
Likewise, as March (2006) pointed out, if exploration is done in a way that fails to initiate the 
paratelic state of mind, it may well result in foolishness or not produce novelty at all. The 
overall challenge in exploration is therefore to find a balance between (paratelic) creativity 
and (telic) realism.  
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This challenge points to three distinct sets of practical implications that are worthy of 
reflection. They regard the management of exploration processes, efforts to stimulate ethical 
decision making more broadly, and the attitude to encountering the uncertainty and risk 
associated with daring ideas.  
First, to the extent that exploration processes are managed, there are central roles to be played 
by the process owners, such as strategy managers, innovation managers, and external 
advisors. Process owners can stimulate the paratelic state of mind, simultaneously monitor it, 
and intervene in order to prevent it from persisting for undesirably prolonged periods. The 
point is not to prevent but to moderate paratelic behavior, as in its absence exploration will 
fail to generate novelty. Further, in order to prevent the paratelic state of mind from ending 
up dominating exploration, process owners can assume responsibility for ensuring that there 
is heterogeneity of views, backgrounds, competencies, and perspectives in the process, such 
that creative and critical thinking are in an ongoing dialogue. It is also advisable to prevent 
exploration from becoming the responsibility and province of a dedicated group, and to allow 
for plurality in participation in exploration. Diversity in participation should in particular be 
sought from compliance and social responsibility departments.  
Second, in a broader sense, it matters what participants bring to the exploration process. Part 
thereof is what they have acquired in business education, such as in EMBA programs. If 
business education pays explicit attention to the moral responsibilities and implications of 
corporate behavior in business education – not as a stand-alone course but integrated in 
strategic management, entrepreneurship, and innovation modules, for example – they become 
more aware of the diverse and heterogeneous set of external expectations in light of which 
they need to develop exploration initiatives; It should help them to “expand their repertoire 
[and] improve their alertness” (Weick, 2006, p. 1724). As an initial step, these programs 
should move away from emphasizing a self-centered profit orientation towards adopting a 
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wider stakeholder approach. Further, if companies decide to formalize their moral 
expectations in corporate policies (but see critical accounts of the usefulness of codes of 
ethics, e.g., Nyberg, 2008; Painter-Morland, 2010), then they should build on concepts such 
as moral integrity, phronesis, and respect and care for others. In light of the uncertainty, 
complexity, and lack of information in exploration to build on rule or outcome-based 
approaches would make the policies too restrictive (Kjonstad and Willmott, 1995).  
Third, and finally, our argument points out how the many calls for radically innovative ideas 
and the benefits of breaking with conformity and developing novel and creative ideas, carry a 
risk with them of overvaluing the paratelic and suppressing the telic state of mind. At the 
same time, exploration will remain a significant and necessary part of corporate success. Yet, 
creativity cannot be managed (Styhre and Sundgren, 2005), and if it is, there is the risk of it 
ending up as a “technology” (Osborne, 2003). This points to an open yet prudent approach to 
pursuing the novel, daring ideas that result from exploration. One such approach may be 
found in (Deweyan) pragmatism, which emphasizes incrementalism with a permanent 
attentiveness to the ongoing accomplishments of the activity, reflexivity, the willingness to 
retrace previous steps and not to foreclose options prematurely. Another such approach may 
be inspired by an encounter with the novel in the form of the Other. This approach offers 
freedom to experiment but also demands responsiveness to Others. This may seem like a 
double-bind, but in effect, it is this very bind that brings about creativity in ethics and 
morality in creativity.  
 
Notes 
[1] We use the word ‘agent’ as a shorthand for one or more organizational members who act 
on behalf of the organization; they are employees with some level of discretion and 
autonomy, such as managers at various hierarchical levels in the organization or specialists.  
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[2] Interpreted as strain, this demand may be a seen as a shortcut to wrongdoing, but this 
interpretation sidelines the agent’s experience.  
[3] Some of the dominant and alternative explanations that Palmer (2012) discusses deal with 
questions of how organizational wrongdoing perpetuates and how bystanders become 
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Table 1: Dominant, Alternative and Reversal Theory Explanations  






wrongdoing as a 
phenomenon 
Abnormal Normal Normal 








Absence of agency 
or constrained 
agency,  











explanation Individual Individual or group Individual or group 































Athena, Hermes * Epimetheus ** Dionysus *** 
 
    * Athena, in her capacity as goddess of reason, intelligence, warfare, and battle strategy; 
Hermes, in his capacity as god of trade and treachery. 
  ** Epimetheus, Titan of afterthought and the father of excuses. 
*** Dionysus, in his capacity as god of parties, festivals, madness, chaos, drunkenness, and 
ecstasy.  
